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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TIIE STATE OF UTAH 
ROYAL RESOURCES, INC., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
GIBRALTER FINANCIAL CORP., 
GIBRALTER SECURITIES CORP., 
(a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Gibralter Financial Corp.,) 
LYNN DIXON, and GEORGE PERRY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
No. 15817 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision granting plaintiff-
respondent judgment in the sum of $10,400 plus interest and 
costs, 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The plaintiff-respondent, Royal Resources, Inc., filed 
suit in the Third District Court on November 24, 1975, 
against Gibralter Financial Corp., Gibralter Securities 
Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of Gibralter Financial 
Corp., Lynn Dixon and George Perry, seeking damages for 
monies had and received by the defendants. On June 17, 1976 
plaintiff's amended complaint (R. 9, 10) was duly filed 
seeking judgment in the sum of $10,680 plus interest and 
costs from the defendants jointly and individually. An 
answer denying individual liability of Lynn Dixon and George 
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Perry was duly filed. (R. 11, 12) On July 12, 1977, trial 
was held by the Honorable Ernest Baldwin, Jr. , Judge, (R. 11 
and on July 22, 1977, judgment was entered in favor of 
plaintiff-respondent against the corporate defendants in~ 
sum of $10,680 plus interest and costs and trial was 
reserved by stipulation against the individual defendants 
and the court approved stipulation that the defendants wooU 
cooperate fully with plaintiff- respondent's attempts to seek 
federal insurance compensation with SCIPIC (R.24,25) On 
December 9, 1977, plaintiff- respondent moved for production 
of documents and order pursuant to Rule 34, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure (R. 26-33) granted by the Honorable DavidB. 
Dee, Judge, on December 13, 1977. (R. 39). On February 24, 
1978, plaintiff-respondent again moved for production of 
documents from defendants (R. 35, 36). On March 6, 1978, 
the Honorable David K. Winder, Judge, granted said motion 
and order (R. 39) allowing 20 days for production. Defe~· 
ants thereupon provided plaintiff-respondent with a computer 
printout daily transaction report (Exhibit 4-P) and copies 
of Gibralter checks to Royal Resources (Exhibit 5-P). Non· 
jury trial was held as to the liability of the individual 
defendants on April 19, 1978, before the Honorable Jay E. 
Banks, Judge. At the time of trial, deferidant George Perry 
was dismissed from the action (R. 41) and judgment was 
awarded in favor of plaintiff-respondent against appellant 
Dixon in the sum of $10 ,400 plus interest and costs (R. 48). 
The appellant has appealed the judgment of the trial court. 
2 
I 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment 
of the lower court together with all costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about November 24, 1975, plaintiff-respondent 
filed a complaint (R.2) subsequently amended (R.9) with the 
Third District Court for the State of Utah against Gibralter 
Securities Corp., Lynn Dixon and George Perry. 
The aforesaid suit sought repayment of loans from the 
defendants individually and jointly in the following 
amounts: 
$1,000 ($680 unpaid principal and $320 unpaid 
fee), on an April 11, 1975 loan to defendant 
Gibralter Securities Corp., and interest thereon. 
$10,400 ($10,000 unpaid principal and $400 
unpaid fee on an April 16, 1975 loan to defendant 
Lynn Dixon. (Exhibits 1-P & 2-P) 
Said loans had been made pursuant to an ongoing busi-
ness relationship between plaintiff and defendants to make 
early settlements (Tr. 57) on stock sales. This business 
involved a practice whereby Royal Resources would advance 
money by way of ~arly settlement for a stock sale so that an 
individual seller would realize his money before the normal 
seven day period. This early payment was discounted and 
Royal Resources would be paid at the end of the non:ial seven 
day period (Tr 57 to 60). 
3 
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Under the normal course of business Royal Resources 
advanced money to customers of Gibralter Securities and 
received an assignment of the proceeds of the customers 
stock sale (Tr. 64). Royal Resources' Mr. Woolley would be 
verbally assured by officers and/or employees of Gibralter I 
I 
Securities that the customer had sold the stock and the pro· I 
ceeds were forthcoming before he would issue a check for 
early settlement (Tr.65). At the end of the seven day 
period Gibralter Securities would issue a check to Royal 
Resources to cover the transaction with the proceeds from 
the sale. 
The transaction in question in the present suit occured 
when Mr. Wooley was told the stock sale had been made 
(Tr.65) and issued the two checks to Lynn Dixon (Exhibits 
1-P and 2-P), but subsequently received no repayment. 
At the time of this transaction Lynn Dixon was Presi· 
dent (Tr.75) and Registered Agent of Gibralter Securities. 
Mr. Woolley made several requests for payment by Gibralter 
Securities (Tr. 84) with no result. Royal Resources then 
commenced this suit. 
During the latter part of 1976, plaintiff-respondent 
investigated, at its own initiative and with the encourage· 
ment of the individual defendants through their counsel, 
Jerry V. Strand, the possibility of recovering or being 
To compensated from the federal insurance program, SCIPIC. 
make such a claim it was necessary to secure the cooperati~ 
of the defendants. Therefore, plaintiff-respondent sought 
4 
I 
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judgment against the corporate defendants and court approved 
stipulation of the parties that defendants would cooperate 
with plaintiff's attempts for federal insurance compensa-
tion. On or about July 12, 1977, (R. 19) judgment was 
awarded plaintiff against the defendant corporations in the 
sum of $10,680 plus interest and costs. The court further 
adjudged: 
"(2) The trial of the remaining issues involving 
individual defendants is hereby continued without 
date, the court approving stipulation of the 
parties that defendants will cooperate fully with 
SCIPIC for the purpose of plaintiff seeking a 
federal insurance compensation for its loss 
herein." (R. 24) 
Cooperation not forthcoming, on or about December 13, 
1977, plaintiff-respondent's filed a motion for production 
of documents and order to permit inspection and copying of 
all records of transactions between defendants and plaintiff 
during the period January 1, 1975, to June 30, 1975, 
specifically the transactions of defendants Dixon, Perry and 
three other individuals. (R. 26-33). 
Defendants' continued failure to produce documents and 
lack of cooperation forced plaintiff to move again on 
February 24, 1978 to compel defendants to comply with the 
July 22, 1977, judgment and to produce documents requested. 
(R. 35, 36) 
5 
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On or about March 6, 1978, plaintiff-respondent's motion w~ 
granted by the Honorable David K. Winder, Judge, with 20 
days given to produce the documents and to aid plaintiff's 
effort to recover from SCIPIC. (R. 39) 
The only documents produced by defendants were copies 
of computer printouts called Gibralter Securities Daily 
Transaction Report for Royal Resources and copies of 
Gibralter checks to Royal Resources. (Exhibits 4-P & 5-P), 
No other corporate or personal records requested by plain· 
tiff were produced by defendants. Defendant Dixon's affi· 
davit of July 6, 1977, was also received. (R. 37, 38) Dixon 
claimed not to be the custodian of records for Gibralter 
Financial Corp., or Gibralter Securities Corp., even thou~ 
he was the President of the corporation. (Tr. 75) Further, 
he never produced records of his personal account which ~ 
later admitted, when questioned by the court, were in his 
possession. (Tr. 71 & 74) 
Plaintiff-Respondent intended to assert to SCIPIC (R. 
24) that it stood in the place of Gibralter's customer, 
either defendant Dixon himself or his client and recover iU 
loss through the federal insurance program. To make this 
claim plaintiff-respondent needed to secure the cooperatioo 
of defendants and the records necessary to find out what 
happened to the proceeds of the two checks to Lynn Dixon. 
(Exhibits 1-P and 2-P) All efforts to secure additional 
documents and cooperation were fruitless. ·Plaintiff-
respondent could not find out if the proceeds of the chec~, 
6 
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payable to and cashed by the defendant Dixon (R.57), went to 
him personally, to a client of his, or to the corporate 
defendants. Indeed Dixon's recollections on the subject 
are, to say the least, hazy (Tr. 67 to 75). The only evi-
dence available (Plaintiff's exhibit 3-P) indicates five 
transactions between Royal Resources and Lynn Dixon. (Royal 
Resources checks No. 36, January 10, 1975; No. 85, March 5, 
1975; No. 122, April 7, 1975; No. 136 and 137, April 16, 
1975 [the transaction at issue]; and No. 163, May 22, 1975.) 
Only one (No. 36) indicates that the transaction was for an 
individual other than defendant Dixon; in this case L. W. 
Fransden. 
Though plaintiff's agent, Mr. Woolley, had been told by 
officers and/or employ~es of Gibralter that stock had been 
sold in the April 16, 1975 transaction (Tr. 65), plaintiff's 
efforts to secure records which would show what stock, if 
any, was in fact sold and by whom, were fruitless. In fact, 
respondent could not find out anything from the defendant 
corporations or defendants Dixon and Perry, personally or as 
President and Registered Agent of the corporations, which 
would allow it to proceed on an insurance claim with SCIPIC. 
The Daily Transacton Record and copies of Gibralter 
Securities checks to Royal Resources (Exhibits 4-P & 5-P) 
show other transactions between Royal Resources and 
Gibralter both before and after the April 16, 1978 trans-
action but it does not show a record of this transaction. 
7 
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Respondent, being fully frustrated with lhe lack of 
cooperation of the defendants, sought individual recovery 
from the defendants. On or about April 
held before The Honorable Jay E. Banks, 
! 
19, 1978, trial was I 
Judge. Defendant 
George Perry was dismissed from the case (Tr. 56) and the 
personal liability of defendant Dixon was at issue. 
The Court's relevant Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (R. 46 & 47) are: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the sum of $10 ,400 is uncontroverted. 
3. That essential records of defendants were not 
produced pursuant to discovery or at the trial of 
this case. 
4. That the facts surroundng the transaction in this 
case, in the absence of clarifying documents, were 
particularly within the province and knowledge of 
defendant Dixon, in his dual role of President and 
customer's man or agent. 
5. That the checks payable to defendant, in the 
absence of documents or sufficient evidence to the 
contrary, support a finding of monies had and received 
by Dixon. 
6. That failure to produce such documents raises a 
presumption that their contents are adverse to 
position of defendants. 
7. That plaintiff's prima facie case shifted the 
burden of proof to defendants, a burden they did not 
meet. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
2. That failure to produce essential documents throu~ 
discovery and at trial is construed as a matter of law 
to deem the .contents thereof adversly to defendants. 
3, That defendants failed to meet the burden of proof, 
which shifted to them. 
4. That defendant Lynn Dixon is liable personally to 
plaintiffs for money had and received and that 
judgment should be awarded against him personally in 
favor of plaintiffs in the sum of $10,400 plus 6% to 
April 19, 1978, plus costs. 
8 
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Judge Banks in awarding judgment to the plaintiff 
stated: 
" ... there's no question about that if they accept an 
assignment they are looking to the assignee, but the 
thing that disturbs me here, you've got a man here with 
two hats. Use the corporation when he wants to . 
. .. He's in the position where he can control - - it's a 
lax thing, these transactions. But sooner or later 
there's got to be some written evidence of something 
here ... One, if it's -- if he's acting as the corpora-
tion, and he's President at this time, he's got company 
accounts. You've got your own accounts. Broker deals 
through his own accounts, through brokers accounts, but 
someplace there's got to be some records. That's the 
thing that disturbs me on it. If it's a company 
account, I mean an assignment, and so forth, someplace 
within that week there's got to be some records in his 
own account, either an assignment or someting to show 
what he's got to do. . 
And I think there's a little heavier burden on 
somebody that's President of the company working 
through his own account as a customer and assigning. 
He's in control of the situation whether it's 
company ... but as President of the company he's privy to 
everything that's going on in the company. He's 
certainly privy to his own account. They made an 
effort to secure some records of that. 
It's a failure of production of any records on 
this situation. He's in the position to maneuver . 
. . . I think that under the situation that he--he 
either through the company or through his own records 
would have to show that this was actually assi~ 
over to the company and it wasn't maneuvered. 
I'll award judgment to the plaintiff. (Tr. 89 
and 90) (Emphasis added) 
9 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD 
APPELLANT PERSONALLY LIABLE 
FOR FUNDS HAD AND RECEIVED 
Defendant-appellant relies on Comment a of the 
Restatement of Agency 2d, §320, to urge that he is not a 
party to the transaction, only the principal is. The 
language of the cited material (Appellant's brief p. 9) 
reads in part: 
" .•. In the absence of other facts, the inference is 
that the parties have agreed that the principal is, a~ 
the agent is not, a party." (Emphasis added) 
The record, however, is notoriously slient on whether 
Gibralter received the proceeds of the alleged stock sale, 
whether defendant paid over to a stock seller customer the 
funds advanced for "early settlement" by plaintiff, or 
whether defendant Dixon kept the proceeds. Dixon testified 
there were no records on the transaction except his personal 
account which he did not produce (Tr. 74, 7 5). This despite 
the fact that plaintiff-respondent had often sought such 
records. (Plaintiffs July 22, 1977 Judgment and Order 
(R. 24); December 9, 1977 Motion for Production of Documents 
and Order (R. 26-33); December 13, 1977 Order (R. 34); 
February 24, 1978 Motion and Notice (R.35); and March 6, 
1978 Order (R. 39). The only evidence available, Dee 
10 
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Woolley's journal (Plaintiff's exhibit 3-P), shows that the 
usual course of conduct was for Royal Resources to issue 
checks directly to individual stock seller customers of 
Gibralter. It is clear from the exhibit that in these rare 
instances when Mr. Woolley issued checks to the customers 
man for a client, that he would so designate by indicating 
the name of the customers man and the client. See Royal 
Resources Exhibit P-3 checks no. 36, January 10, 1975 (R. 
28); No. 65, February 14, 1975 (R. 29); No. 120, April 4, 
1975 (R. 31); and No. 133, April 11, 1975 (R. 32). On only 
one of the five transactions between Royal Resources and 
Lynn Dixon is there indicated that the transaction was for a 
third party. (Royal Resources check No. 36, January 10, 
1975). The other four transactions, including the April 16, 
1975, transaction at issue, have no such designation. 
Without defendant Dixon's records it is impossible to deter-
mine where the money went in any of the transactions. 
Defendant corporations bookkeeper Lois Crowder's testi-
mony was that there had to have been a stock transaction and 
that the funds were held by Gibralter in a general account 
and not paid over to plaintiff because Gibralter went broke. 
(Tr. 79, 80) But again, with the evidence available (only 
Exhibits 4-P & 5-P had been received by plaintiff pursuant 
to discovery) she was unable to show any entry corresponding 
to an allegation that defendant Dixon made a stock trans~ 
action or that the funds found their way into the Gibralter 
general account. (Tr 76, 78, 80) 
11 
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We can only conclude that the funds did not reach 
Gibralter's general account, and for whatever unexplained 
reasons, Lynn Dixon was, in this instance, acting for him· 
self. 
Appellant, further asserting his view, cites: 
Generally, an agent is not responsible for money had 
and received where the money is paid over by the agent I 
to his principal. 3 Am Jur 2d Agency, §§301, 302. 
(Defendant-Appellant's Brief, P. 10) 
I 
Plaintiff-respondent does not disagree with this as a 1 
general statement of the law, but, again, the record fails I 
to reveal any facts supporting an allegation that funds ever I 
reached the principal, a third party customer or Gibralter. 
1 
If in fact the corporate defendant was the principal, 
defendant Dixon as its President is not the average "agent". 
It is well established that under various circumstances t~ 
corporate veil can be pierced to get at officers or direc· 
tors when the facts warrant the application of equitable 
principles to go behind the corporate personality to the 
individual. (See Henn on Corporations §§146, 147 at 250-~ 
2d Ed. 1970) 
In Shepherd v. Bering Sea Originals, 578, P2d. §587, 
590 (Alaska, 1978), the Alaska Supreme Court discussed dis· 
regarding the corporate entity and stated: 
"There are many decisions in which courts have piei;ced 
the 'veil of corporate fiction' ... Generally speaking, 
such decisions have been based on the requirements of, 
justice or to prevent fraud, bad faith or other wrong. 
(Citations ommitted.) 
12 
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In Amoco Chemicals Corp. v. Bach, 222 Kan. 589, 567 
P2d 1337, 1341-42 (1977), the Kansas Supreme Court set forth 
a list of factors which it would consider in disregarding 
the corporation function: 
"An examination of the cases discloses that some of the 
factors considered significant in justifying a dis-
regard of the corporate entity are: (1) Undercapital-
ization of one man corporation; (2) Failure to obscure 
corporate formalities; (3) Nonpayment of dividends; 
(4) Siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant stock-
holder; (5) Nonfunctioning of other officers or 
directors; (6) Absence of corporate records; (7) Use 
of the corporation as a facade for operations of the 
dominant stockholder or stockholders; and (8) The 
use of the corporate entity in promoting injustrce-
or fraud. (Emphasis added) 
And in Burns vs. Norwesco Marine, Inc., 13 Wash. App. 
414, 535 P.2d 860, 863 (1975), the Washington Supreme Court 
stated: 
Although the facts have varied from case to case, the 
corporation entity has been disregarded when it is used 
to perpetuate a fraud or wrong, gain an unjust advant-
age or evade an obligation (numerous citations 
ommitted) ... in some jurisdictions, directors and 
officers of a corporation may be held directly liable to 
corporate creditors for breaches of duty owed the 
corporation, especially during the corporation's in-
solvency. This may include acts of neglect. 19 C.J.S. 
Corporations §846 (1940). 
See also Henn, Agency-Partnership at 117, (1972) Agents 
liability where principal is non-existant. 
Failure of an officer to differentiate between personal 
activities and those of the corporation would certainly be 
grounds to "pierce the corporate veil" and establish 
personal liability on the officer. 
13 
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Defendant Dixon's testimony is unclear on exactly what 
happened concerning the April 16, 1975 transaction. He 
stated the stock was sold in his account (Tr. 67, Line 11), 
that he was not clear whether or not the stock was sold in 
his account (Tr. 67, Line 15), that he didn't know if the 
stock was in his account or someone else's (Tr. 70, 71); 
that he didn't recall who he wired the money to (Tr. 70), 
that he was unclear what happened to the money (Tr. 75), 
that he didn't know what stock it was (Tr. 69) and that a 
trade ticket would identify the particular trade (Tr. 68). 
The only evidence, before the trial court, of what happen~ 
to this particular transaction is Royal Resources journal 
(Exhibit 3-P) and the only individual indicated was defen-
dant Dixon. 
While it is not clear from the evidence which capacity 
defendant Dixon was acting in (personally, agent for 
Gibralter, agent for a third party customer), it is clear 
that he had control of the records, as President of the 
corporation or his personal records, which could shed light 
on the transaction, and that he failed to produce such 
records. (Tr. 71, 74) 
Defendant's failure to produce requested documents, 
records and his lack of cooperation thwarted plaintiff's 
efforts to recover from SCIPIC (July 12, 1977 Judgment (R. 
24), and further brought about the trial court's finding of 
fact #6 and #7 shifting the burden to the defendant to sh~ 
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what actually happened as well as the finding that defendant 
did not meet the burden. (R. 47) It is clear that neither 
the exhibits nor the record herein offer any compelling 
explanation of what really happened to the sums advanced. 
By the weight of appellant's own cited authority, he is not 
in this case entitled to the protection ordinarily afforded 
an agent for a disclosed principal. 
While plaintiff-respondent, in amending (R.9, 10) its 
original complaint (R. 2, 3), thought that defendant Dixon 
was acting as agent for defendant Perry (Perry was dismissed 
at trial R. 46, 47, 48; Tr. 56), plaintiff still kept a 
cause of action against Dixon individually: 
(8) That defendants are liable jointly and individ-
ually for monies had and received, or in the alter-
native are unjustly enriched in the amount claimed. 
or if defendant Perry was actually the undisclosed principal 
(a fact that could not be ascertained by discovery through 
either individual defendant) there still would be a clear 
cause of action against defendant Dixon. Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint states: 
(7) That defendant Dixon is liable individually in 
that he was acting as an agent of George Perry in his 
personal, not corporate capacity; ... (R. 10) 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the judgment of 
the trial court for plaintiff-respondent. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED 
THAT FAILURE ON PART OF APPELLANT 
TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS 
RAISED A PRESUMPTION THl'.T THE 
INFORI1ATION SOUGHT WAS UNFAVORABLE 
TO APPELLANT. 
It is well settled that failure to comply with the 
Court's pre-trial discovery order may result in a presurnp· 
tion that the concealed information is unfavorable to the 
defendant. In 31 C. J. S. Evidence §156(b) it is stated: 
I 
"The unexplained failure or refusal of a party to I 
judicial proceedings to produce relevant and competent 
documentary evidence or an article which would tend to I 
throw light on the issues authorizes, under certain 
circumstances, an inference or a presumption unfavor· 
able to such party. 
Possession or control of such evidence by the 
party against whom the inference or presumption is 
sought to be invoked, is necessary; the rule does not 
apply where the evidence is equally available to botl 
parties. Further, it must appear that there has been 
an actual suppression or withholding of the evidence; 
no unfavorable inference arises where the circumstances 
indicate that the document or article in question has 
been lost or accidentally destroyed, or where the 
failure to produce it is otherwise properly accounted 
for." 
In fact, such failure can result in as stringent a 
I 
Rasbury v. Bainum, 15 Utah 2d' result as awarding judgment. 
62, 387 P2d 239 ( 1963). This court in Tucker v. Nunley, 16 
Utah 2d. 97, 396 P.2d 410 at 412 (1964) established the 
following standard: 
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"We recognize that the granting of a judgment 
against a party solely for disobeying an order to 
cooperate in discovery procedure is a stringent measure 
which should be employed with caution and restraint and 
only where the failure has been willful and the 
interest of justice so demands. Except in very aggra-
vated cases, less serious sanctions undoubtedly could 
be applied to accomplish the desired result, particu-
larly where there is any likelihood of injustice by 
depriving a party of a meritorious cause of action or 
defense. Whether the failure to comply with the 
court's order has been willful and whether the 
circumstances are so aggravated as to justify the 
action taken is primarily for the trial court to 
determine. Unless it is shown that his action is 
without support in the record, or is a plain abuse or 
discretion, it should not be disturbed." (Emphasis 
added) 
Plaintiff-appellant attempted on several occasions 
(plaintiff's Motion for Production of Documents and Order 
December 9, 1977, (R. 26) and the Court's order of December 
13, 1977 (R. 39); plaintiff's second motion February 24, 
1978, (R. 35) and the Court's Order of March 6, 1978) to get 
corporate and personal record of the defendants. Defendants 
produced a computer printout daily transaction sheet 
(Exhibit 4-P) and copies of checks from Gibralter to Royal 
Resources (Exhibit 5-P) and defendant Dixon's Affidavit 
(R-37) stating that he did not have custody of any docu-
ments. It remains a mystery how defendant could produce the 
Royal Resources daily transaction records and none of the 
daily transaction' records for Richard Macon, Lynn Dixon, 
Scott Taylor, M. C. Mason and George Perry called for in 
plaintiff's Motion for Production of Documents (R. 26). It 
is also unanswered why no personal records of at least the 
defendants Perry and Dixon were ever produced. Dixon in 
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fact admitted he had his own records (Tr. 71). The requested I 
records were a necessary part of plaintiff's attempt to 
recover insurance from SC IP IC (as ordered July 22, 1977, R. I 
24). Plaintiff, both on its own initiative and after urging 
from defendants' counsel, Jerry V. Strand, was attempting to 
build a case that it stood in the place of the customer to I 
whom it made the early settlement, as that customer surely 
would have been covered by the federal insurance. Plaintifi 
needed to know what stock was involved and who sold it, 
Dixon or a third person who was Dixon's client. If it was 
Dixon, his records would so indicate. If it was his client 
he still should have, as the customer's man, some record of 1 
it. If it, in fact, involved the corporate defendants, 
Dixon as President should have had access to the records. 
Clearly in this case the trial court could justify t~ 
Findings of Fact (Tr. 46-47) 
3. That essential records of defendants were 
not produced pursuant to discovery or at 
the trial of this case. 
4. That the facts surrounding the transactions 
in this case, in the absence of clarifying 
documents, were peculiarly within the province 
and knowledge of defendant Dixon, in his dual 
role of President and customer's man or agent. 
6. That the failure to produce such documents of 
the transactions raises a presumpton that 
their contents are adverse to the position of 
defendants. 
7. That plaintiff's prima facie case shifted 
the burden of proof to defendants, a burden 
which they did not meet. 
and could have awarded judgment for plaintiff solely on 
defendants' refusal to produce. 
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Further, plaintiff-respondent notes that Rasbury and 
Tucker merely affirms the extent of the power of the trial 
court if not abused. In the instant case the trier of fact 
did not award judgment on the failure to produce alone, it 
merely shifted the burden to the defendant. 
It is clear that the trier of fact may draw an un-
favorable inference or there may be raised a presumption 
with reference to a failure to produce documents. (See 
Londerholm and NAACP v. Unified School District No. 500, 199 
Kan. 312, 430 P.2d 188 at 197 (1967); Whitney v. 
Canadian Bank of Commerce, 374 P.2d 441 at 442 (Oregon 
1962); State Tax Commission v. Graybar Electric Co., 86 
Ariz. 253, 344 P.2d 1008 at 1011 (1959); Shehtanian 
v. Kenny, 156 Cal. App. 2d 516, 319 P.2d 699 at 702 (1958); 
Talbert v. Ostergaard, 276 P.2d 880 at 884,5 (Cal. 1954); 
Bengston v. Shain, 255 P.2d 892 at 895 (Wash 1953); 
Williams v. Cor.unercial Nat. Bank of Portland, 90 P. 1012 
(Oregon 1907). Such failure, quoting appellant's own cited 
authorities, does shift the burden and raises "an inference 
or a presumption unfavorable to such party" (31 C.J.S. 
Evidence, §156(b). We concede the rule does not apply 
"where the evidence is equally available to both parties" 
id. However, the trial court here clearly found such was 
not thE: case, and indeed that "the facts surrounding the 
transaction in this case, in the absence of clarifying 
documents, were peculiarly within the province and knowledge 
of ... " (R. 46) defendant Dixon. The Court found, and as 
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I 
trier of the fact, was entitled to find, that the failure ~I 
produce documents raises a presumption that their contents 
were adverse to defendants (R. 46-47) and that in the 
absence of documents or evidence to the contrary, a con-
clusion that the monies were had and received by defendant 
! 
Dixon was proper. This failure to produce documents shif~I 
the burden of proof to defendant and he failed to meet that I 
burden. (R. 46-47) 
Appellant urges that he had no access to the records 
Gibralter and that they were equally accessible to respond· 
ent. The record clearly fails to support that. Defendant 
Dixon was President of Gibralter (Tr. 75) as well as its 
registered agent. Who else, if not he, would have access1 
Nor did he or others provide respondent with access despite 
strenuous efforts to compel discovery. 
Appellant further urges that the trial court herein 
relieved respondent of plaintiff's burden to prove its cl~ 
and substituted a negative inference as substantive proof. 
We submit that whether the non-production of evidence is a 1 
I 
mere inference or a true presumption, the trial court did ! 
not err. It is obvious from the record that the court founi 
plaintiff's evidence credible and supportive of a prima 
facie case. Having produced such evidence, the burden 
shifts. Citing appellant's Utah authority, we direct the 
Court's attention to the three concluding paragraphs of 
Keesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d, 1043 (Utah 1975): 
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The proponent of a proposition has two 
burdens relative to his proof: to produce 
evidence which proves or tends to prove the 
proposition asserted; and to persuade the 
trier of fact that his evidence is more 
credible or entitled to the greater weight. 
Once the proponent has produced such evidence, 
the burden of producing evidence disproving 
or tending to disprove the proposition shifts 
to the opponent, and he must introduce such 
evidence as may be necessary to avoid the risk 
of a directed verdict or a peremptory finding 
against him as to the existence of the proposition. 
The burden of persuasion does not shift, 
however, and remains upon the party asserting the 
proposition. Thus, where, as here, the proponent 
has the burden of persuading the trier of fact by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that it, that the 
asserted proposition is more likely than not, he 
carries that burden throughout the trial. Having 
adduced sufficient evidence to show or tending to 
show the existence of the proposition, and having 
thus met his burden of production, he nevertheless 
suffers the risk of nonpersuasion or disbelief. 
Plaintiff produced evidence tending to prove 
the existence of a partnership. Defendant produced 
opposing evidence and further produced evidence 
which tended to prove a joint venture of the nature 
heretofore described. The trial court, exercising 
_its prerogative as a trier of fact in a nonjury 
£ase, weighed the credibility: of the witnesses, 
2n_d ___ ~<!§_ no~rsuaded by plain ti ff' s evi_Ii~_nc~ 
This court will not disturb such_a_determina.t.ion_ 
when reasQ~abl~eD_Q_Qllld differ as to the weight 
to be _given to conflictinE evidence. (Citations 
ommitted~)- (Emphasis added) 
The court's finding did not rest upon the non-produc-
tion of documents alone, but rather, having found plain-
tiff's claim of monies had and received credible, shifted 
the burden to respondent. The non-production of documents 
giving rise to a presumption that the matters therein are 
unfavorable to him. Plaintiff-respondent need not urge that 
such presumption supplies a missing link in the case alone 
or that it is independent evidence of a fact otherwise 
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unproved. It remains uncontroverted th~t monies were had 
and received by appellant. A shift to the appellant to 
explaint that liability rested elsewhere was justified. 
This he failed to do by any compelling affirmative, proba-
tive evidence. Thus, coupled with the presumption to be 
drawn from non-production of documents, he cannot and should 
not prevail. 
As this court, in Koesling, after noting the state of 
the law, distinguishing the burdens of producing evidence 
and of persuading the trier of fact, concluded: 
"The trial court, exercising its preroga-
tive as a trier of fact in a nonjury case, 
weighed the credibility of the witnesses, and 
was not persuaded by plaintiff's evidence. 
This court will not disturb such a determina-
tion when reasonable men could differ as to 
the weight to be given to conflicting evidence." 
(Emphasis added) 
This court should affirm the judgment of the trial 
court for plaintiff-respondent. 
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POINT Ill 
RESPONDENT WAS NOT PRECLUDED FROM 
JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT WHEN IT 
TOOK JUDGMENT AGAINST THE CORPORATE 
DEFENDANTS. 
The record is clear that defendants agreed to fully 
cooperate with plaintiff to seek redress in the form of 
federal insurance compensation through SCIPIC. Indeed, 
previous counsel for defendants, Jerry V. Strand, urged that 
plaintiff take judgment against the corporate defendants to 
support such a claim (R. 24). Pursuit of such a clam failed 
in large part, due to failure of defendants to produce 
documents. It is also clear from the record that plaintiff 
made no "election" which would preclude action against 
defendant Dixon. Plaintiff's amended complaint sought: 
8. That defendants are liable jointly and 
individually for monies had and received, 
or in the alternative, are unjustly 
enriched in the amount claimed. (R. 10) 
and prays for judgment against defendants jointly and indi-
vidually. It is further clear that the Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwin, Jr., taking the stipulated default judgment against 
the corporate defendants, acknowledged that the "big ques-
tion is individual liability" (minute entry R. 17, 18) and 
also by stipulation that all rights were reserved against 
the individual defendants. See minute entry R. 17, 18, 19 
and Judgment and Order which states: 
23 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. The trial of the remaining issues 
involving individual defendants is 
hereby continued without date, the 
court approving stipulation of the 
parties that defendants herein will 
cooperate fully with SCIPIC for the 
purpose of plaintiff seeking federal 
insurance compensation for its loss 
herein. (R. 24) 
As argued before, at that point in these proceedings, 
plaintiff-respondent was not privy to sufficient facts to 
fully make its case to SCIPIC. Hence its subsequent efforts I 
I 
to compel discovery. 
Respondent further submits that the law requires appel· 
1 
lant to have moved to compel respondent to elect. 
Costello v. Kasteler, 7 Utah 2d 310, 324 P.2d. 772 
(1958) is cited by appellant as follows: 
"Appellants further contend that the court 
erred in granting judgment against both of them 
since the court found that at the time of the 
negotiations for the services appellant Kasteler 
did not disclose to respondent that he was acting 
as the agent for the appellant Uranium Chemical 
Corporation and the law is well settled that where 
a contract is entered into with the agent of an 
undisclosed principal for the use and benefit 
of the principal an election must be made as to 
whether the agent or the principal will be held 
liable, but a judgment cannot be obtained against 
both. As authority appellant cites Love v. St. 
Joseph Stock Yards Co., 51 Utah 305, 169 P. 951. 
That case does contain a dictum to that effect 
and respondent concedes that the majority rule 
in the United States is to the effect that 
after discovery of an undisclosed principal a 
judgment cannot ordinarily be obtained against 
both the principal and the agent. As stated 
in 118 A.L.R., page 704, note 111: 
'It has generally been held 
that where the agent and undisclosed 
24 
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principal are joined, the plaintiff 
may not have judgment againt both, 
but must, prior to judgment, elect to 
hold one or the other.' 
Ordinarily plaintiff would not be entitled to judgment 
against both." 
but appellant fails to conclude the court's finding: 
Ordinarily plaintiff would not be entitled 
to judgment against both. However, appellants 
did not demand or move for an election by 
respondent as to whether the principal or 
agent should be held and the failure to do so 
was a waiver. See note lll(b), 118 A.L.R. page 
707 and cases therein cited. Since respondent 
in his brief has stated that if this court 
should find that he is not entitled to judgment 
against both appellants then he requests that 
he be allowed to make his election in this 
court and chooses to hold the agent Kasteler. 
We deem it proper to grant this request. 
Affirmed with instructions to vacate the 
judgment against appellant Uranium Chemical 
Corporation. 
It is clear that appellant must move to compel respondent to 
elect. In the instant case no such demand or move was made, 
and appellants failure, under Costello, constitutes a waiver 
by him. 
Appellant cites the Restatement of Contract §119(1): 
"A judgment rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction within the United States against 
one or more joint promisors, or against one or 
more joint and several promisors, upon a joint 
promise, discharges the joint duty of the other 
joint promisors." 
And 3 AmJur. 2d Agency, §309: 
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"[T]he rule followed almost universally is 
that if the third party, after learnin~ 
facts and the identify of the principal, 
brings suit and recovers judgment against the 
agent, this is an election against the agent 
which will bar a subsequent action agajnst 
the principal, regardless of whether the 
judgment is or is not satisfied. A judgment 
against the principal will likewise have the 
effect of barring a subsequent action by the 
third person against the agent.'' (Emphasis 
added.) 
as further authority for his position. It is apparent that 
a requirement for election is knowledge of the identity of 
the principal. If this is the case, respondent could not 
have made an election because it was unable to determine 
through discovery, who, if not Dixon, the undisclosed 
principal was. 
In fact, appellant is arguing that he is the agent of 
Gibralter. Plaintiff urges that as President, Registered 
Agent and customer's man, he still must be held personally 
liable. He alone was in a position to show what actually 
happened and he would not do so. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the judgment of 
the trial court for plaintiff-respondent. 
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POINT IV 
A REVIEWING COURT WILL NOT DISTURB 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS IF THERE 
IS REASONABLE BASIS IN EVIDENCE OR 
LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEM. 
It is a well established rule that the appellant 
carries the burden of showing a substantial basis for upset-
ting the trial court's findings and judgment. This court in 
Elwell & Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 27 Utah 2d 188, 
493 P.2d 1283 (1972) held that with respect to a lower 
court's verdict and judgment "all presumptions favor their 
validity." Elwell case parallelled the present case in that 
in both instances the records concerning the original 
controversy were incomplete. In Elwell, an action by a 
contractor against the city and railroads to recover money 
allegedly due beyond contractual amount for installation of 
sewer lines, the determination of the trial court, although 
based on incomplete information, was sustained since appel-
lant could not overcome the presumption that favors the 
trial court's finding. 
Similarly in Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499 (Utah 
1976) an action contractors brought to foreclose a mechan-
ic 1 s lien and to recover damages for breach of contract, 
this court held that the finding of damages would not be 
overturned since evidence could be found to support the 
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trial court's findings. This court again relied on the 
theory that appellants carry the burden of showing from the 
record that the trial court erred. A number of other Utah 
cases support the rule that if there is a reasonable basis 
either from the evidence or from the lack of evidence, the 
trial court will be upheld. Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d ~7 
(Utah 1974); First Sec. Bank of Utah NA v. Wright, 521P.~ 1 
563 (Utah 1974); Latimer v. Kalz, 508 P.2d 542 (Utah 1973); 
Holly v. Federal American Partners, 507 P.2d 381 (Utah 
1973); Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Assn., 470 P.2d 393 
(Utah 1970), see also Tucker v. Nunley cited on pages 16 and 
17 herein. 
From the record in the present case, the trial court 
held in favor of plaintiff-respondent based upon the fact 
that essential records of the defendants were not produced 
pursuant to discovery and that such records were peculiar~ 
within the province and knowledge of defendant Dixon and 
therefore the Court shifted the burden to the defendant, a 
burden he did not meet. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment, R. 46-49.) 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the judgment of 
the trial court for plaintiff-respondent. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
properly awarded judgment to plaintiff-respondent; that 
there was evidence that defendant-appellant had and received 
monies and that there was no evidence that said monies went 
to either the corporate defendants or to a third party 
customer of defendant Dixon. If, as appellant urges, de-
fendant Dixon received the money as agent for the defendant 
corporations, the corporate veil should be disregarded 
because as President, customer's man and registered agent, 
he should have been able to produce evidence to indicate 
what actually happened to the monies. 
Respondent further submits that the trial court proper-
ly concluded that failure on the part of the defendants to 
produce documents or records raised a presumption that was 
unfavorable to appellant and was justified in shifting the 
burden of proof to defendant Dixon to disprove respondent's 
prima facie case. 
Respondent submits that under its pleading, facts and 
evidence of this case, no election was required as to which 
of the defendants it must pursue for judgment. Alterna-
tively, even if such election must be made, appellant had 
the duty to move for such election. 
Finally, respondent submits that the trial court's 
findings were based on the preponderance of evidence and 
fact and that this Court should affirm the judgment. 
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